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INTRODUCTION 
The record will be referred to as nR, ) .» 
References to the transcript will be designated as "T. M-
) ,fl using the clerk's volume reference (19 volumes, 
designated as "A" through "S") and the reporter's page numbers. 
When certain lines on a page are referenced, for example Volume 
D, page 126, lines 3-14, this format will be used: (T. D-126:3-
14)." Exhibits will be referred to as "Exhibit " and pages 
within exhibits as Exhibit 38:1, 5, 8, to refer to pages 1, 5 and 
8 of Exhibit 38. The Appendix (ffApp.lf) includes the 
transcript excerpts demonstrating the comments on the evidence. 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Does a plaintiff waive objections to numerous 
comments on the evidence involving statements, interruptions and 
non-verbal conduct occurring on each day of a 12-day trial, where 
plaintiff does not make a contemporaneous objection to every such 
comment and does not file an affidavit of prejudice? 
2. Is an expert witness in a brain-injury case a 
surprise witness where: (a) the expert conducts a Rule 35 IME for 
defendants who then give notice that the expert will not be 
called; (b) the expert changes his mind and agrees to appear, but 
the fact is concealed from plaintiff for two to four weeks; 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(c) the expert's name appears on a witness list just six (6) 
business days before trial; (d) there is no realistic opportunity 
to depose the expert before trial; and (e) the written report 
required by Rule 35 is provided on the third day of trial and is 
incomplete? 
COURT OF APPEALS DECISION 
The Utah Court of Appeals filed its opinion on February 
13, 1990. The case is currently styled as Emmanuel N. Onyeabor 
v. Pro Roofing, Inc., a Utah corporation and Pam Bates, 128 Utah 
Adv. Rpt. 23, 787 P.2d 525 (Utah App. 1990) (see Attachment A at 
end of Brief). 
JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT 
The decision of the Court of Appeals was entered on 
February 13, 1990. On March 15, 1990, Petitioner obtained an ex 
parte 3 0-day extension of the time to file a Petition for a Writ 
of Certiorari, which expired on April 16, 1990. On April 13, 
1990, by stipulation and order of the court, Petitioner obtained 
an additional seven-day extension to file this Petition, which 
extension expires on April 23, 1990. The Supreme Court has 
jurisdiction over this case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 1953, 
§78-2-2(3)(a), as amended (1989). 
-vi-
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CONTROLLING STATUTES 
Two controlling Rules which govern this case are: Rules 
26(e) and 35(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (see Attachment B 
at end of Brief). 
-vii-
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Petitioner, Emmanuel N. Onyeabor, filed a personal 
injury action alleging a closed-head organic brain injury and a 
herniated lumbar disc. The case was tried to a jury beginning 
February 2, 1987, and continuing through February 18, 1987. The 
jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff but awarding the 
sum of only $16,850. The verdict was reduced by 25% due to a 
finding of contributory negligence on the part of Mr. Onyeabor 
(R. 658). A motion for a new trial and additur were both denied 
on April 1, 1987 (R. 20-1). This appeal was timely taken from 
the Judgment on Jury Verdict and the order denying the motion for 
a new trial and additur with notice of appeal being filed on 
April 30, 1987 (R. 722). 
Five b^sic issues were presented in the briefs. One 
issue dealing with plaintiff's alleged contributory negligence 
was decided favorably to plaintiff, and two other issues are not 
pursued in this Petition. The two remaining issues in this 
Petition deal with the prejudicial impact of comments on the 
evidence and the appearance of a surprise, expert witness. 
The case was argued to the court of appeals in October, 
1989. The decision was issued on February 13, 1990. 
// 
// 
// 
1 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. COMMENTS ON THE EVIDENCE. 
The court made numerous prejudicial comments on the 
evidence by stating or inferring lack of believability of expert 
witnesses and the quality of their evidence; making extraneous 
prejudicial statements in ruling on the admissibility of certain 
evidence; and repeatedly interrupting counsel and witnesses 
without cause and making prejudicial comments in so doing (see 
Tables I and II herein). The main objectionable comments are 
contained in the Appendix. A flavor of the nature of the 
comments can be gleaned by reading Appendices 1, 2 and 3 (Table 
I), and 15, 16 and 17 (Table II). 
The court also exhibited a prejudicial attitude toward 
Mr. Onyeabor and his counsel. This attitude was reflected in the 
court's demeanor including facial expressions, sighs, frowns and 
body language (Apps. 36-39). This attitude was also shown by the 
frequent refusal to allow counsel to approach the bench on 
important issues (T. B-46, C-76, 1-103). In general the court 
was very harsh with Mr. Onyeabor1s counsel in front of the jury, 
particularly during the first three days of trial (T. D-443-444). 
Objections were made to the comments on the evidence 
which occurred on the during the first three days of trial. 
Unfortunately, the reporter had gone home, but court subsequently 
acknowledged these objections on the record: 
[Judge Croft] And you're absolutely right. 
We had a conference, and you in no uncertain 
2 
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terms stated your objection to not only my 
telling them that [about the notebooks], but 
you though that I was being very antagonistic 
toward you in my conduct of the trial, 
(emphasis added) 
(T. P-87:18-22) . 
B. FACTS REGARDING DR. LINCOLN CLARK. 
During the course of the litigation of this case, there 
were five separate trial dates set: 8/14/85, 4/18/86, 11/17/86, 
12/8/86 and 2/2/87 (R. 18, 100, 124, 199, 302). Mr. Onyeaborfs 
current counsel entered the case in July of 1986, and promptly 
amended the complaint, setting forth the issue of brain injury 
and damages more precisely (R. 145). Since the trial was at that 
point scheduled for November 17, 1986 (R. 124), the defense 
immediately moved for a Rule 35 mental examination of the 
plaintiff to be performed by Edward C. Beck, Ph.D., a 
psychologist (R. 155). Dr. Beck apparently get sick, so on 
November 8, 1986, defendants again moved for a continuance of the 
trial (R. 252) . Defense counsel stated: 
The undersigned further represents that he 
will use all reasonable efforts to obtain the 
services of a substitute expert as rapidly as 
possible consistent with an adequate 
presentation of the case. The undersigned 
further represents that he will use all 
reasonable efforts to cooperate with 
plaintifffs attorney in providing an 
opportunity to him to discover the substance 
of the expert's evaluation and opinion, 
(emphasis added) 
(R. 255) . On November 10, 1986, the Motion for Continuance was 
heard, and the trial was continued until December 8, 1986 (R. 
199) . 
3 
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During that period, the defendants procured a 
substitute expert, Dr. Lincoln Clark, a University of Utah 
psychiatrist. Dr. Clark examined Mr. Onyeabor. Thereafter he 
told defense counsel that he categorically would not be a witness 
at the trial (T. S-19). 
Defendants moved for a continuance, which was 
strenuously opposed by Mr. Onyeabor because of his precarious 
medical and psychological condition (T. S-19-21). Dr. Clark was 
therefore summoned before the court on December 5, 198 6, and 
examined on the record by Judge Dee. Dr. Clark stated he would 
not under any circumstances testify at trial and that his 
decision was final and irrevocable: 
I've already expressed I want out of 
this. I mean I made that very clear at the 
beginning. And I regret the inconvenience 
and everything else it has caused, and I wish 
it could be otherwise. I would otherwise be 
happy to proceed even with this short notice 
involved — that's involved. But I simply— 
and I say I thought about this very seriously 
before I came to this conclusion because I 
had a certain reputation — myself, I'm 
concerned about as a witness, and I don't 
want to compromise that ... . And I'm not 
going to change my mind. (emphasis added) 
T. S-18-19). Dr. Clark admitted that he had not been threatened 
by Mr. Onyeabor; he was simply fearful (T. S-18:6). 
Judge Dee reluctantly ordered a fourth continuance of 
the trial to allow the defendants to procure yet another 
substitute expert witness in the head injury area to replace Dr. 
Clark (T. S-26-27). On December 16, 1986, Mr. Stegall confirmed 
to Mr. Onyeabor's counsel that the defense expert would be 
4 
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psychologist Robert Cook, Ph.D. On December 17, 1986, the 
parties appeared before Judge Dee for a scheduling conference, 
and the new trial date of February 2, 1987, was set (R. 302). 
Mr. Onyeabor was examined by Dr. Cook in Salt Lake City in mid-
January (T. K-89), and his deposition was pre-scheduled with 
counsel for Monday, January 26, 1987, in Denver (App. 40, p. 3). 
On Thursday, January 22, 1987, exactly six business 
days prior to trial, Mr. Onyeabor's counsel received a revised 
witness list from Mr. Stegall (R.308), which included Dr. Lincoln 
Clark as a proposed witness! This was the first notice of Dr. 
Clark since his "irrevocable" withdrawal on December 5, 1986. 
Because Mr. Stegall was in Denver during January 23-27, 1987, 
and because Judge Dee, who was retiring effective January 31, 
1987, wanted Judge Croft to hear motions, the first opportunity 
to schedule a motion in limine was Friday, January 30, 1987. 
At the hearing on the Motion in Limine, Mr. Stegall 
indicated he had known about Dr. Clark's "reappearance" since 
"the first part of January" (T. Q-38). Dr. Clark testified at 
trial that he decided to come back into the case some time around 
Christmas, 1986 (T. L-127-128). This was never reported to 
plaintiff's counsel, despite many oral and written communications 
(App. 40) . Judge Croft nevertheless denied the Motion in Limine 
(R. 326:T. Q-54). 
Mr. Onyeabor's counsel did not receive a written report 
of the results of Dr. Clark's examination until the third day of 
trial, February 4, 1987. The report was incomplete in that it 
5 
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did not render a psychiatric diagnosis of Mr. Onyeabor (App. 41: 
7). 
Dr. Clark testified convincingly at trial (L-76-80, 
91,3, 94, 96-97, 103-104, 156-158, 192-193), rendering an opinion 
that Mr. Onyeabor suffered numerous pre-existing psychological 
problems (T. L-192-193). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
A PLAINTIFF SHOULD NOT BE REQUIRED, UPON PAIN 
OF WAIVER, TO MAKE A CONTEMPORANEOUS 
OBJECTION OR FILE A RULE 63 AFFIDAVIT OF 
PREJUDICE TO EVERY JUDICIAL COMMENT ON THE 
EVIDENCE, WHERE AN EARLY OBJECTION IS LODGED 
AND THE COMMENTS ARE NUMEROUS, OCCURRING ON 
VIRTUALLY EVERY DAY OF A 12-DAY TRIAL. 
A. IMPORTANCE OF THIS ISSUE 
The application of the waiver doctrine in this case is 
important to the practice of law in the State of Utah. The Court 
of Appeals' decision wrongly and unfairly requires 
contemporaneous objection to each of many comments on the 
evidence. This is an impractical and harsh burden on counsel 
and litigants, and does not appropriately assign responsibility 
to the court. 
The doctrine of waiver as applied by the Court of 
Appeals in this case is an obsolete doctrine that fails to 
recognize the realities of the practice of modern law. The 
Supreme Court, through this case, should take the opportunity to 
6 
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establish the State of Utah as an adherent of a more modern, 
practical approach to waiver. 
B. NUMEROUS PREJUDICIAL COMMENTS ON THE EVIDENCE. 
The trial court made numerous comments on the evidence 
which could generally be classified as: statements or inferences 
that the quality of plaintiff's expert testimony was weak; 
disruptive interjections; and non-verbal conduct that indicating 
that the court favored the position of the defendants (see 
Appendices 1 through 35) . Utah law prohibits the court from 
commenting on the evidence. Rule 51, U.R.C.P. This court has 
stated: 
[A] trial judge is not permitted to comment 
on the quality or credibility of the evidence 
and may not indicate that the evidence is 
either weak or convincing. ... the court is 
... enjoined from commenting on the quality 
or credibility of the evidence in such a way 
as to indicate that it favors the claims or 
position of either party. The enjoinder is 
necessary to prevent any intrusion upon the 
prerogatives of the jury to judge the 
credibility of the evidence and to determine 
the facts. (emphasis added). 
State v. Long, 721 P.2d 493 at 496 (Hall, C.J. concurring and 
dissenting) (Utah 1986). 
The court's demeanor, including facial expressions, 
gestures and actions can also amount to a comment on the 
evidence. Egede-Nissen v. Crystal Mountain, Inc., 606 P.2d 1214 
(Wash. 1980). Any statement or action that can be reasonably 
interpreted to indicate the court's belief or disbelief 
concerning the veracity of witnesses, is a comment on the 
evidence. Id. Comments made during a trial which influence the 
7 
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jury concerning the merits of the case, or which affect 
substantial rights of litigants, constitute grounds for reversal. 
Messier v. Simmons Gun Specialties, Inc., 687 P.2d 121 at 129 
(Okla. 1984). 
Interjections and interruptions may constitute a 
comment on the evidence, particularly where they occur or are 
"phrased in a manner indicative of the court's attitude towards 
the merits of the case ..." Eqede-Nissen, supra at 1222. The 
cumulative effect of repeated interjections by the court or 
comments on the evidence may constitute reversible error, even 
though each such interjection, standing alone, might not be 
error. Eqede-Nissen, supra at 1223. 
C. OBJECTION WAS LODGED, CONTRARY TO STATEMENTS IN 
COURT OF APPEALS OPINION. 
The Court of Appeals1 Opinion (hereinafter "Opinion") 
infers that plaintiff made no objection on the record to court's 
comments on the evidence, thereby waiving the objection. The 
Opinion states that Utah law therefore precludes appellate review 
of the issue. This analysis is faulty for several reasons. 
First, it is undisputed that plaintiff did make an objection to 
the court's comments on the evidence and prejudicial demeanor at 
the end of the third day of trial. Unfortunately, the court 
reporter had gone home, but the objections and the substance 
thereof was acknowledged by the court on the record: 
[Judge Croft] And you're absolutely right. 
We had a conference, and you in no uncertain 
terms stated your objection to not only my 
telling them that [about the notebooks], but 
8 
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TABLE I 
DIRECT COMMENTS ON EVIDENCE BY TRIAL COURT 
| Very Serious"! 
App. Day of Witness Name/ Transcript 
No. Trial/Date Called By Vol, /Page Substance and Effect of Comment on Evidence 
1. 8 - 2/11 Alan Heal (P) J 175-180, 
182 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
8 
7 
11 
7 
- 2/12 
- 2/10 
- 2/17 
- 2/10 
Boyd Pjeldsted 
(P) 
Edward Spencer 
M.D. (D) 
Linda Gummow, 
Ph.D. (P) 
Linda Gummow, 
K 
I 
M 
H 
18-22 
45-46 
29-30 
29-31 
3 - 2/04 Thomas 
Soderberg, M.D. 
Gerald Moress, 
M. D. 
Richard 
Nielsen, M.D. 
(P) 
Court expresses doubt that Mr. Onyeabor will ever go out and get a job as a 
superintendent of a construction project; casts doubt on Heal's opinion as to 
what Onyeabor would have made and interjects statements that emphasize that 
Heal's opinion is not valid for the U.S. but only for Nigeria; casts doubt 
upon Onyeabor1s income potential. 
Judge casts doubt on validity of expert's testimony as to value of lost future 
earnings by referring to it as "pure speculation"; reveals his opinion of Mr. 
Onyeabor1s earning potential by allowing only testimony of $5.00 per hour. 
Interjects comments that emphasize negative aspects of witness's testimony 
about Onyeabor. 
Judge offered opinion that counsel had not asked a certain question; (he was 
wrong - see T. 193-4 (2/12)). 
Court indicates sua sponte opinion that expert is not qualified to render an 
opinion as to whether Onyeabor was unconscious at scene because expert wasn't 
present. 
D 325, 333, Judge discredits documentary evidence by making disparaging comments about use 
348, 382, of exhibit notebooks given to jurors at beginning of trial; severely scolds 
383, 443, counsel in front of jury. 
444 
11 - 2/17 Linda Gummow, M 49-53 
Ph.D. (P) 
On issue of using treatises to rebut prior witness's testimony, judge makes 
numerous comments that cast discredit upon plaintiff's expert by expressing 
dubiety on methods employed by the witness. 
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TABLE I CONTINUED 
App. Day of Witness Name/ Transcript 
No. Trial/Date Called By Vol./Page Substance and Effect of Comment on Evidence 
| Serious | 
8. 2 - 2/03 Dennis Leavitt, C 76-79 
(P) 
Judge expresses doubt that Onyeabor•s car struck center median, causing him 
to be jostled; casts plaintiff's theory of mechanism of injury into doubt; 
and cross-examines witness. 
9. 2 - 2/03 Dennis Leavitt, C 72 
Officer (P) 
10. 3-4 -
11. 
2/04-
2/05 
5 - 2/06 
Richard Goka 
M.D. (P) 
Linda Gummow 
Ph.D. (P) 
D 483-
E 495-6 
F 845 
12. 
13. 
14. 
3 -
8 -
2 -
2/04 
2/11 
2/03 
Patrick Chukwu 
(P) 
Elizabeth 
Onyeabor (P) 
Dennis Andrews 
(P) 
D 
J 
C 
295 
132-135 
142-144 
Judge comments that the officer's experience did not justify him in express-
ing opinion that Onyeabor could have struck head; casts doubt on plaintiff's 
theory of head trauma causing brain injury. 
Judge says he is "troubled" by a glossary of terms and states that most words 
used by the doctor "don't mean a thing to us ... I am sure they don't to the 
jury"; effectively casts doubt on testimony of expert medical witnesses. 
Judge interjects sua sponte and cuts off witness who is explaining future 
risk of head injury to plaintiff; thereby implies little risk. 
| Important) 
Judge refers to Nigerian witness as one of "these young ones," demeaning this 
witness and other younger Nigerians who had previously testified. 
Casts doubt about ability of wife to have knowledge of and comment on why 
plaintiff took certain classes more than once, and why he had certain grades. 
Questions witness sua sponte about details of accident leaving impression 
that witness was perhaps not thorough. 
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TABLE II 
INTERJECTIONS AND INTERRUPTIONS (SUA SPONTE)* BY TRIAL COURT 
1 Very Serious Interruptions tl 
App. Day of Witness Name/ Transcript 
No. Trial/Date Called By Vol./Page Substance and Effect of Interjection or Interruption 
15. 3 - 2/04 Richard Nielsen D 460 
M.D. (P) 
16. 6 - 2/09 Mark Zelig, 
Ph.D. (P) 
G 95-96 
Judge invites opposition to object to expert's qualifications; casts doubt 
upon expert's qualifications. 
Judge interjects comment to help defense; scolds plaintiff's expert witness; 
one of few instances in trial where judge interjected during defense exami-
nation. 
17. 8 - 2/11 Alan Heal (P) J 187 Judge interjects to help defense; questions plaintiff's expert on basis of 
opinion. 
18. 6 - 2/09 Mark Zelig, 
Ph.D. (P) 
G 66-67 Judge interjects and tells jury that the doctor is "broadening his answer 
... too much." 
19. 9 - 2/12 Boyd Fjeldsted K 9 
(P) 
Rude interjection which implies that plaintiff's counsel has suggested an 
answer. 
20. 8 - 2/11 Alan Heal (P) J 196 
21. 
22. 
23. 
8 
3 
9 
- 2/11 
- 2/04 
- 2/12 
David Nilsson 
Ph.D. (P) 
Gerald Moress, 
M.D. (P) 
Robert Cook, 
J 
D 
K 
63 
422 
209 
Rude and unnecessary interjection which suggests that plaintiff's expert 
has not answered a question posed by defense counsel. 
Rude interruption during plaintiff's examination of expert suggesting that 
expert has exceeded his expertise. 
Interjects to question expert witness about where plaintiff hit his head. 
Court interjects to help defense witness on re-cross as to what was said 
earlier. 
24. 4 - 2/05 Richard Goka, E 497 
M.D. (P) 
1 Serious Interruptions | 
Questions plaintiff's expert as to whether he understands certain head 
injury terms from a glossary. 
* Raised by the court without defense counsel objections. f Other serious interjections are cataloged in Table I, 
Tab Nos. 3, 5, 6, and 11. 
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TABLE II CONTINUED 
App. Day of Witness Name/ Transcript 
No. Trial/Date Called By Vol./Page Substance and Effect of Interjection or Interruption 
25. 8 - 2/11 David Nilsson, J 38 
Ph.D. (P) 
26. 5 - 2/06 Duncan Wallace, F 744-5 
M.D. (P) 
27. 
28. 
29. 
30. 
8 -
6 -
11 -
3 -
- 2/11 
- 2/09 
- 2/17 
- 2/04 
David Nilsson, 
Ph.D. (P) 
Mark Zelig, 
Ph.D. (P) 
Emmanuel 
Onyeabor (P) 
Richard Goka, 
J 
G 
M 
D 
9 
9 
6 
4 
M.D. (P) 
Questions plaintiff's expert about something that "troubled me" regarding 
scope of jury's decision to decide the case. 
Judge interjects to unnecessarily restrict plaintiff's re-direct examina-
nation on expert witness's own drop in IQ after expert's gas poisoning head 
injury; defense counsel had earlier raised the issue of expert's own injury 
on cross-examination to impeach expert's objectivity. 
Interjects in attempt to narrow scope of answer by plaintiff's expert. 
Interrupts to help defense counsel's examination on issue of grades. 
Interrupts plaintiff's answer to important question. 
Interjects to try to narrow scope of witness's expertise. 
31. 7 - 2/10 Emmanuel I 103 
Onyeabor (P) 
32. 3 - 2/04 Stevens D 311-12 
Pedersen (P) 
33. 3 - 2/04 
34. 3 - 2/04 
35. Many/ 
Various 
Richard Goka, D 476-7 
M.D. (P) 
Richard Nielson D 456 
M.D. (P) 
Patrick Chukwu Many 
Mr. Onyeabor 
Pamela Walker, MA 
Stevens Pedersen 
Richard Goka, M.D. 
Linda Gummow, Ph.D. 
Mark Zelig, Ph.D. (P) 
1 Unnecessary and Disruptive Interjections [ 
Price of left-front tire repair offered to show that plaintiff did in fact 
hit the median strip and was severely jostled; witness hassled by judge. 
Didn't want plaintiff's father-in-law to testify about the fact that he was 
hard of hearing; offered to lay foundation that plaintiff's wife would 
notice hearing problems in plaintiff caused by the accident. 
Interrupted to get evidence admitted before plaintiff's counsel had 
finished laying foundation. 
Unnecessary scolding of counsel on evidentary matter. 
Many rude, unnecessary, annoying interruptions and interjections that 
amounted to witness intimidation. 
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vou thought that I was being very 
antagonistic toward you in my conduct of the 
trial. (emphasis added) 
(T. P-87:18-22). The objections were also referenced in Mr, 
Onyeabor's motion for a new trial (R. 694-5) and the argument on 
the motion for a new trial (T. P-24-.19-22). 
The Opinion finds that such an objection, though 
undisputedly made, cannot be countenanced on appeal because there 
was no record, citing Birch v. Birch, 771 P. 2d 1114 (Utah App. 
1989) and Franklin Fin, v. New Empire Dev. Co., 659 P.2d 1040 at 
1045 (Utah 1983). However, those cases do not stand for that 
proposition, and should not apply to the facts of this case. In 
Birch, for example, the trial court allegedly told the appellant 
in an off-the-record discussion that his mind was made up before 
the trial. The appellant entered into a stipulation and then 
asked to have the resulting order set aside 88 days later. The 
alleged remarks were disputed by the court and opposing counsel, 
and there was no reference in the record whatsoever to support 
the appellant's contention. Birch, supra at 1116. However, in 
Onyeabor the court acknowledges the substance of the objections 
having been made in a timely manner. 
In Franklin, the appellant claimed an argument was 
raised in the hearing on a motion for summary judgment. However, 
there was no evidence supporting his claim that the argument was 
in fact raised at that time. The Franklin court stated: 
For a question to be considered on appeal, 
the record must clearly show that it was 
timely presented to the trial court in a 
manner sufficient to obtain a ruling thereon; 
9 
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we cannot merely assume that it was properly 
raised. 
Franklin, supra at 1045. In Franklin, there was nothing in the 
record or briefs to show the objection was ever made. In 
Onyeabor, there is a reference in the record acknowledging the 
objection. The Franklin opinion suggests that if there had been 
something in the record to indicate the argument, the result 
would have been different. 
The Court of Appeals1 Opinion also refers to a 
requirement of filing a Rule 63(b) affidavit alleging judicial 
bias, and infers that absent such an affidavit of bias, 
Petitioner's claims are not properly before the court on appeal. 
The Opinion states: "we need not decide, however, whether the 
sole failure to file this affidavit was procedurally fatal to the 
claim of bias ..." because of other alleged infirmities. Thus, 
it would appear that references to the Rule 63(b) affidavit are 
dictum, and not the basis of the decision herein. In any event, 
the citation of the Birch case is inappropros. Onyeabor 
involves an on-the-record acknowledgement by the court of a 
timely objection. There is no such acknowledgement of a timely 
objection in Birch. 
D. STRICT, INFLEXIBLE APPLICATION OF THE WAIVER DOCTRINE 
IS BAD PUBLIC POLICY AND DENIES SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE. 
The Court of Appeals has applied the waiver doctrine in 
this and other cases with an inflexible, meat-ax approach. 
Essentially, under the standard set forth in Onyeabor, if a 
10 
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contemporaneous objection is not lodged to each comment on the 
evidence, it is waived. The court stated: 
Although reluctance to make frequent 
objections may be understandable, we failed 
to find in the portions of the record 
highlighted by plaintiff even one such 
contemporaneous obj ection. 
Onyeabor, supra at p. 527. 
In support of that position, the Court of Appeals does 
not cite even one case that deals with "comments on the 
evidence." Birch dealt with bias and Franklin Finance dealt 
with an unrecorded oral argument on a motion for summary 
judgment. The court also cites Hill v. Cloward, 14 Utah 2d 55, 
58, 377 P.2d 186, 188 (1962), for the proposition that it is 
unjust for a party to just sit silently by, though believing 
prejudicial error has been committed, and then belatedly assert 
the issue on appeal. However, Hill deals with failure of a party 
to object to the introduction of evidence of insurance, and 
subsequent failure to ask for an instruction to rectify the harm 
that was done. The Opinion cites Madsen v. Prudential Fed. Sav. 
& Loan, 767 P.2d 538, 542 (Utah App. 1988). In Madsen, the judge 
indicated before ruling that he was a customer of the defendant 
bank. Despite the clear disclosure of the conflict, defense 
counsel made no motion to recuse the judge until 39 days after 
the decision. 
Thus, none of the cases cited by the Court of Appeals 
in support of its requirement of a contemporaneous objection deal 
with comments on the evidence, which is the issue in Onyeabor. 
11 
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It seems strange indeed that when Petitioner writes 4 0 pages of 
brief (main and reply briefs) on the issue of "comments on the 
evidence,11 cites seven cases dealing with failure to object to 
comments on the evidence and attaches 4 0 appendices relevant to 
that issue, the Court of Appeals does not even cite one relevant, 
factually similar case that supports it's position. 
Petitioner has no quarrel with the general rule that 
objections should generally be waived if not made at trial. 
However, this rule should not be inflexibly applied, 
particularly in cases such as this, where the objections would be 
futile, counterproductive or could not correct the error. One 
treatise commented: 
However, because of the special status of the 
trial judge in the eyes of the jury, 
prejudicial and erroneous comments by the 
trial judge during the trial may be reviewed 
on appeal even where not objected to at the 
time they are made. (emphasis added) 
75 Am. Jur. 2d, "Trial, " §120, p.218. The court should not 
find a waiver where it is obvious that continued objections to 
repeated comments on the evidence would simply emphasize and 
exacerbate the prejudice. In Collins v. Sparks, 310 S.W.2d 45 
(Ky. 1958), the trial judge questioned a witness during the 
direct examination of a rear-end collision case and asked, in 
conclusion, "You honestly believe that?" No objection was made. 
The reviewing court noted that the remarks imputed that the judge 
did not believe the witness1 testimony, which was critical to the 
case. The appellate court overturned the jury's verdict in this 
case, noting: 
12 
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When the trial judge makes an objectionable 
remark, counsel is faced with a dilemma. He 
may risk antagonizing a judge by calling 
attention to the objectionable remarks, which 
scarcely can be erased in the minds of the 
jurors by a subsequent admonition. If 
objection is made unsuccessfully, the harm 
may be aggravated, and the situation may be 
worsened. He may make no objection in the 
hope that the jury will ignore the remark. 
This places the counsel in an unfair 
position and at a disadvantage which may not 
be due to any conduct on his part. The trial 
judge is charged with knowing how to conduct 
a fair and impartial trial. He should know 
what is necessary to be said and when it 
should be said, bearing in mind the possible 
effect on the jury. Viewed in this light, an 
objection to the remarks of a trial judge is 
unnecessary, and when such remarks are 
prejudicial, they constitute such palpable 
error as will be considered on review.... 
Id. at 48-49. In the Collins case, the court noted that a motion 
for a new trial on the issue preserved the right to object on 
appeal, even though no objection was made at trial. In Onyeabor, 
the issues raised in this brief were argued extensively in the 
motion for new trial, which provided the trial court an 
opportunity to correct the error and the prejudice if it so 
desired (R. 694-695). 
The futility of continued contemporaneous objections by 
counsel in this case is manifest. The court acknowledged 
counsel's strong objection at the end of the third day of trial 
(T. P-87:18-22 "... and you in no uncertain terms stated your 
objection . . . " ) . Yet, perusal of Tables I and II show that 23 of 
Petitioner's 35 claimed comments on the evidence occurred after 
the third day of trial. Thus, despite the clearly acknowledged 
objection, the objectionable conduct continued. 
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The Court of Appeals1 Opinion puts counsel in the 
position of losing a possibly winnable case by antagonizing the 
jury because of perceived "attacks" on the judge, or to lose it 
by forfeiting all rights on appeal because contemporaneous 
objection was not lodged. Such a requirement is unfair, 
particularly where the court fs demeanor and attitude was 
prejudicial throughout the trial and the comments on the evidence 
were frequent, pervasive and came without warning. One court 
characterized the effect on the jury of the judge fs actions as 
follows: 
Every lawyer who has ever tried a case, and 
every judge who has ever presided at a trial, 
knows that the jurors are inclined to regard 
the lawyers engaged in the trial as 
partisans, and are quick to attend an 
interruption by the judge, to which they may 
attach an importance and a meaning in no way 
intended. It is the working of human nature 
of which all men who have had any experience 
in the trial of case may take notice. 
Between the contrary winds of advocacy, a 
juror would not be a man if he did not, in 
some of the distractions of mind which attend 
a hard-fought and doubtful case, grasp the 
words and manner of the judge as a guide to 
lead him out of perplexity. On the other 
hand, a presiding judge has no way to measure 
the effect of his interruption. The very 
fact that he takes a witness away from the 
attorney for examination may, in the tense 
atmosphere of a trial, lead to great 
prejudice. (emphasis added) 
State v. Jackson, 145 P. 470 (Wash. 1915), quoted with approval 
in Risley v. Moberg, 419 P.2d 151 at 153 (Wash. 1966). 
The difficulty of repeated objections by counsel and 
interjections by the judge and their impact on the jury is 
evident when one postulates possible contemporaneous objections. 
14 
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For example, the objection to the comments in Appendix 1 would 
have gone something like this: 
Your honor, I object to your inference that 
you do not believe that Mr. Onyeabor could 
have obtained a job as construction 
superintendent (T. J-177; App. 1); or 
I object to your statement that jobs Mr. 
Onyeabor could have held in Nigeria are 
irrelevant, even though Mr. Heal, a 
qualified rehabilitation expert has said that 
they are relevant (T. J-180, 182; App. 1). 
With respect to Appendix 2, the objection might have read: 
I object to your statement that my expert 
economist's testimony is "pure speculation," 
just because it is based in part upon 
functions and income of Mr. Onyeabor in 
Nigeria. That is a matter of weight for the 
jury. 
The objection to the comment in Appendix 3 could have read: 
Your Honor, I object to you unnecessarily 
emphasizing, sua sponte, that my client's 
medical records show some "hysterical 
features." 
The objection to the comment in Appendix 15 would have read: 
Your Honor, I object to your sua sponte 
inference that Dr. Richard Nielsen has not 
been qualified and is not an expert in the 
field of otolaryngology, and that there is no 
foundation for his testimony. 
Although in real life, the objections would have been tempered a 
little more, the prejudicial impact would not likely escape the 
jury's notice. 
Had contemporaneous objections been made, it 
undoubtedly would have sparked additional prejudicial exchanges 
such as the one which occurred in Appendix 6 over the use of the 
exhibit notebooks. On that occasion, counsel attempted an 
15 
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objection of sorts to the court's instruction to the jury not to 
refer to exhibit notebooks. That incident provoked a more 
prejudicial exchange with the court than if nothing had been said 
(T. D-443-4; App. 6). 
E. THE WAIVER DOCTRINE IS OBSOLETE, 
The Court of Appeals has not correctly applied the 
waiver doctrine in this case. A fact-sensitive application of 
the waiver doctrine in this case should produce a different 
result. However, in the event this Court determines the doctrine 
to have been correctly applied by the Court of Appeals, then the 
doctrine itself should be discarded as it relates to judicial 
improprieties because it is obsolete. Other states have done so. 
In Commonwealth v. Hammer, 494 A.2d 1054 (Pa. 1985), 
the trial judge conducted an extensive and repeated examination 
of witnesses and was charged by the defendant as acting ofttimes 
in the role of an advocate for the prosecution, sometimes 
exhibiting incredulity at defendant's testimony. No objection 
was made by the defense counsel to the court's manner of 
questioning of witnesses, so the prosecution claimed waiver. 
Pennsylvania had adhered to the doctrine of waiver, but the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court questioned "the continued validity of 
the waiver doctrine as applied to improprieties of the trial 
judge;11 strict enforcement of the doctrine "becomes inadvisable11 
when the position of power and authority enjoyed by the trial 
judge is considered. Id. at 1058. The Pennsylvania court 
16 
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explained the policy of not requiring an objection in this type 
of case as follows: 
The efficacy of counsel in assuring 
impartiality of the judge is negated by this 
self-regulatory function and the authority 
of the bench, for a judge who poses a 
question or makes a comment during trial is 
predisposed to believe that the question or 
comment is proper, lest it not be spoken. 
Given that predisposition, the likelihood 
that the judge will be well-cautioned by 
counsel's objection is negligible. In that 
context, the rationale underlying the waiver 
doctrine, that timely objection gives the 
court the opportunity to cure the error, 
becomes a relatively empty one. Indeed, the 
possibility exists that counsel•s objection 
would be viewed as a source of annoyance and 
may well aggravate the situation. (emphasis 
added) 
Id. at 1059. This was precisely the situation faced by 
Onyeabor's counsel in this case. The court exhibited a 
predisposition against Onyeabor. A strong objection was voiced 
at the end of the third day of trial. The problems continued. 
The court's demeanor was harsh and intimidating throughout the 
trial as witnessed by the four affiants (see Appendix Nos. 3 6 
through 39) . The "opportunity to cure the error" that the 
respondents argue for in this case would have been truly an 
"empty one." 
Petitioner does not argue necessarily that this Court 
should throw out the waiver doctrine entirely, as some courts 
have done. Rather, Petitioner proposes a balanced, flexible 
approach, particularly where it is obvious that contemporaneous 
objection would have been to no avail. Where the trial judge 
shows a repeated inclination to comment on the evidence, to 
17 
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interject statements in the record sua sponte, and/or exhibits a 
demeanor and attitude which is prejudicial (Appendices 3 6-39), a 
flexible approach to the waiver doctrine is warranted. The 
suggested position is: 
If there is a reasonable possibility that a 
timely objection would have cured or resolved 
the problem, then the objection should be 
deemed waived; however, where the comments or 
conduct are so frequent or significant that 
an objection would likely be futile, 
counterproductive or otherwise meaningless, 
contemporaneous objection should not be 
required as long as the matter is raised in a 
post-trial motion. 
Such a position would not only be reasonable and in 
harmony with the position of many other states, but would also 
have significant benefit for both the bench and the bar in Utah. 
A strict application of the waiver rule puts the entire burden of 
waiver at trial on counsel, and hence on the public who are the 
litigants. Thus, under the "strict" approach, attorneys and the 
public bear the burden even for the errors of judges. Yet, 
judges as individuals are given a pre-eminent position in the 
law. They are supposedly chosen from the better lawyers, and are 
presumed to have above-average abilities, knowledge of the law 
and wisdom. Judges were described in one case as follows: 
The judge occupies an exalted and dignified 
position; he is the one person to whom the 
jury, with rare exception, looks for 
guidance, and from whom the litigants expect 
absolute impartiality. ... To depart from 
the clear line of duty through questions, 
expressions or conduct, contravenes the 
orderly administration of justice. 
18 
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Commonwealth v. Mvma. 123 A. 486, at 487 (Pa, 1924) , as cited in 
Hammer, supra at 1058. 
A strict application of the waiver doctrine is not only 
unfair to the public and their attorneys, but, in the long run, 
harmful to the bench. It reduces the incentive for a judge to 
conduct a trial in a fair, impartial and responsible manner. It 
rewards poor judicial conduct rather than encouraging excellence. 
Strict enforcement of the waiver doctrine also demeans 
the judiciary in the eye of the public. If a judge conducts a 
trial in an arbitrary and capricious manner and "gets away with 
it," no matter how outrageous or egregious the facts may be, it 
will appear to the public participants that a "technicality" is 
being used to deny substantial justice, and that arbitrary judges 
are above the law. 
The balanced approach proposed by Mr. Onyeabor places a 
proper amount of responsibility both on counsel and judges. It 
says that both must be competent and responsible. It promotes 
the fair administration of justice. The court should adopt this 
approach. 
F. THE COURT ERRED IN STRIKING AFFIDAVITS TO 
SUPPLEMENT THE RECORD. 
The Opinion stated that there was nothing in the record 
to contradict defendants1 claim that the comments on the evidence 
were simply "explanatory" or "clarifying." Opinion, supra at 
528. The court's footnote indicates that although Petitioner 
submitted four memoranda "attesting ... non-verbal manifestations 
of bias on the part of the judge" and the motion to supplement 
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the record was provisionally granted, the court was now denying 
the motion to supplement. The affidavits are included as 
Appendix Nos. 36, 37, 38 and 39. Because of the unusual nature 
of this case, such affidavits should be countenanced on appeal. 
Defendants had the opportunity to respond with counteraffidavits. 
There is no other way to show non-verbal conduct, which simply 
will not appear within the four corners of the record. 
Accordingly, Petitioner requests this court overrule the Court of 
Appeals and accept the affidavits. 
G. SUMMARY. 
The Court of Appeals Opinion tells the average 
practitioner that if a judge comments on the evidence, he has to 
take a bad situation and make it worse in order to preserve the 
issue for appeal. That position is impractical, unfair and 
unwise. It is impractical and unrealistic to ask trial counsel 
to antagonize a jury and a judge, which most assuredly would 
happen, by making a contemporaneous objection to every comment on 
the evidence, where the comments are numerous. In this case, it 
was very important for the Petitioner to try the case, and not 
have a fifth continuance for medical reasons. Good judicial and 
social policy dictates that the court should adopt a flexible 
approach to the waiver doctrine and not require contemporaneous 
objection where the objections would be fruitless or more 
damaging to the plaintiff's case than silence. In the 
alternative, the court should reject the waiver doctrine. 
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POINT II 
DR. LINCOLN CLARK, A DEFENSE PSYCHIATRIST, 
WAS A PREJUDICIAL SURPRISE WITNESS BECAUSE: 
HIS REAPPEARANCE IN THE CASE WAS CONCEALED 
FROM PETITIONER UNTIL SIX BUSINESS DAYS 
BEFORE TRIAL; THERE WAS NO REALISTIC CHANCE 
TO TAKE A MEANINGFUL DEPOSITION; THE DOCTOR'S 
RULE 35 IME REPORT WAS NOT PROVIDED UNTIL THE 
THIRD DAY OF TRIAL AND WAS INCOMPLETE; AND 
THE DOCTOR'S TESTIMONY CAUSED PREJUDICE. 
A. IMPORTANCE OF THIS ISSUE, 
The effect of the Court of Appeals1 decision is to 
allow very late notice of a major expert witness. Such late 
notice will be deemed substantial compliance with Rule 26(e) 
U.R.C.P. (duty to seasonably supplement discovery responses on 
identity of expert witnesses) as long as the other side conducts 
thorough cross-examination at trial and has called experts on the 
same subject matter. 
This ruling will lessen the standards of practice among 
litigating attorneys. However, this Petition presents an 
opportunity to make an important statement that unfair discovery 
tactics will not be tolerated. Such a statement is necessary to 
uphold the perceived fairness of the system. It is important 
that application of the pre-trial discovery rules has the 
appearance of being fair and even handed. 
B. SURPRISE WITNESSES SHOULD BE EXCLUDED. 
Rule 26(e)(1) provides that a party has a duty to 
"seasonably . . . supplement his response with respect to ... the 
identity of each person expected to be called as an expert 
witness at trial. ..." The court should exclude a defense 
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medical expert where the name and/or subject matter of the 
testimony is not disclosed in a timely manner. Acosta v. 
Superior Court, 706 P.2d 763 (Ariz. App. 1985); Hadid v. 
Alexander, 462 A.2d 1216 (Md. App. 1983); Lodrigue v. Houma-
Terrebone Airport Comfn, 450 So.2d 1004 (La. App. 1984) ; and 
Sturdivant v. Yale-New Haven Hosp.. 476 A.2d 1074 (Conn. App. 
1984) . Exclusion of the witness is further justified where no 
report or a late report is prepared, or where the report does not 
disclose important information. Otherwise, cross-examination is 
hindered. Hoover v. U.S. Dept. of Interior, 611 F.2d 1132 (5th 
Cir. 1980); Sirianni v. General Motors Corp., 325 F.Supp. 509 
(W.D. Pa. 1971); DeMarines v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 433 
F.Supp. 1047 (E.D. Pa. 1977). 
The trial court abuses its discretion if it denies a 
Rule 59(a)(3) motion for a new trial where there is a surprise 
"which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against.11 Jensen 
v. Thomas, 570 P.2d 695 (Utah 1977). The surprise contemplated 
by Rule 59(a) must result from some adverse circumstance or 
situation in which a party is placed unexpectedly to his injury, 
and without any fault or negligence of his own. Havas v. Haupt, 
583 P.2d 1094, 1095 (Nev. 1978). 
C. DR. CLARK WAS A SURPRISE WITNESS. 
Dr. Clark was most assuredly a surprise witness. He 
irrevocably left the case on December 5, 1986. Notice of his 
reappearance was not received until Thursday, January 22, 1987, 
just six business days prior to trial. 
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Dr. Clark's reappearance in the case was obviously 
concealed from Petitioner for two to four weeks, despite the 
requirements of Rule 26(e)(1). At the hearing on Petitioner's 
Motion in Limine to exclude Dr. Clark, defense counsel stated 
that he had known about Dr. Clark's reappearance since "the first 
part of January" (T. Q-38-39). Yet, Petitioner's counsel was not 
served with a notice until January 21st. There was no written 
report as required by Rule 35 until the morning of the third day 
of trial, February 4, 1987. Neither delay has ever been 
explained. 
Dr. Clark's own trial testimony is puzzling and evasive 
on the issue: 
Q. (Mr. Sykes): When did you do that [offer 
to re-enter the case]? 
A. (Dr. Clark): I have forgotten the exact 
date when that occurred? 
Q. Early in January, late in December? 
A. I think that Mr. Steqall would have to 
answer that. 
Q. I am asking you. 
A. I do not have a record, of that, when it 
was exactly. 
Q. Well do you — it has only been two 
months. Do you recall approximately, was it 
before or after Christmas? 
A. Well, I think it was after Christmas, but I am not 
certain of that. (emphasis added) 
(T. L-127-128). Prior to Dr. Clark's reappearance, all of the 
correspondence and oral conversation between counsel indicated 
that Dr. Cook of Denver would be defendants' only expert witness 
on the issue of brain injury. (App. 40 and 41) Petitioner 
prepared for trial accordingly. 
23 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Courts generally refuse to allow surprise experts to 
testify in similar situations. For example, in Hoover v. U.S. 
Dept. of Interior, supra, the Court held that an opposing party 
is entitled to discover the substance of the facts and the 
opinions of the expected testimony. "The primary purpose of this 
required disclosure is to permit the opposing party to prepare an 
effective cross-examination." (emphasis added) Id. at 1142. An 
"effective cross-examination" is precisely what was denied 
Petitioner with respect to Dr. Clark. In the case of DeMarines 
v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, supra, the defendant in an airline 
decompression case called a doctor of whom no prior notice was 
given, to testify that the Petitioner's condition resulted from 
pre-existing causes (similar to Dr. Clark's testimony in this 
case). The Petitioner's counsel objected to this improper 
testimony on the grounds that the report furnished to him by the 
doctor did not contain any such diagnosis. The trial judge 
excluded the testimony ruling: 
I am not going to permit that testimony if 
there is not something [about the problem] in 
this report because, frankly, the very reason 
for handing over reports is so that both 
sides will be aware of what is going on and 
not be sprung any surprises. (emphasis 
added) 
Id. at 1058. The Court also noted the importance that all 
parties be informed "before trial as to the substance of the 
other party's expert testimony in order that he may be prepared 
to meet this testimony and will not be surprised by it." Id. at 
1059. The appellate court, therefore, found no prejudicial error 
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in excluding the doctor's testimony. Accord, Hadid v. Alexander, 
supra, Sturdivant v. Yale-New Haven Hosp., supra (the court 
correctly refused to allow a party's medical expert to testify 
where the party had claimed that although the medical expert had 
been informally consulted previously, he had not been formally 
retained until the day after the jury selection began; the court 
characterized this conduct as "tactical subterfuge,lf which 
justified the sanction). 
The policy reasons for forbidding a last minute expert 
to testify where the untimeliness of notice is unexplained are 
well set out in the case of Acosta v. Superior Court, supra, 
which has amazing parallels to Qnyeabor. In Acosta, the 
plaintiff was a petitioner in a wrongful death malpractice action 
scheduled for trial on September 4, 1985. The real party in 
interest was an anesthesiologist. The defense list of witnesses 
did not include a certain doctor. Two days after the deadline 
for filing notice of witnesses, and 18 days prior to the trial 
date, defense counsel apparently received a letter from the 
doctor containing his opinion as to the cause of death. The 
defense counsel notified the plaintiff's counsel that the doctor 
would be a witness but did not furnish a report until 13 days 
later, or five days before trial. The witness in question was 
unavailable for deposition until trial. The trial judge 
indicated his intention to allow the witness to testify, and the 
plaintiff brought a special action appealing the trial court's 
refusal to strike the expert witness. The appellate court held 
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that the trial court had abused its discretion, and vacated the 
order allowing testimony by the witness. The appellate court 
stated that preclusion of a witness: 
. . . should only be invoked where there is 
both absence of good cause for the 
untimeliness and prejudice to the opposing 
party. Both conditions are met on the facts 
of this case. Counsel for the [defendants] 
has suggested no reason for the late 
revelation of the witness save failure of his 
clients to discovery him until the eve of 
trial. This is not good cause; dilatoriness 
never is. Beyond this, no reason was 
advanced for withholding the content of the 
witness1 testimony for an additional two 
weeks. (emphasis added) 
Id. at 764. 
D. PREJUDICE CAUSED BY DR. CLARK. 
The Court of Appeals Opinion states: "... plaintiff 
fails to demonstrate how he was prejudiced" and any error would 
have to be disregarded unless it affected "the substantial rights 
of the parties under Rule 61, U.R.C.P. Reversal would follow 
only if Petitioner demonstrated that the error was substantial 
and prejudicial and "... deprived [appellant] in some manner of a 
full and fair consideration of the disputed issues by the jury." 
The Opinion indicates that because of Petitioner's "extensive 
presentation of expert testimony and ... thorough cross-
examination of Dr. Clark," Petitioner has failed to demonstrate 
prejudice. Opinion, supra at 529. This holding ignores the 
realities of trial practice. The prejudice was as follows: 
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1. Failure to Provide a Timely Report. The prejudice 
to Mr. Onyeabor involves several dimensions. The first is the 
failure to provide a timely report, as required by Rule 35(b), 
U.R.C.P. That rule states: 
. . . the party causing the examination to be 
made shall deliver to [the plaintiff] a copy 
of a detailed written report of the examining 
physician setting out his findings, 
including the results of all tests made, 
diagnosis and conclusions. ... (emphasis 
added) 
Even though Dr. Clark had been back in the case since late 
December or early January, no report had apparently been prepared 
as of the time of the Motion in Limine, January 30, 1987, so the 
court ordered defendants to produce a report from Dr. Clark 
within a few days. The seven page report was hand-delivered to 
Petitioner's counsel on the morning of Wednesday, February 4, 
1987, the third day of trial. (App. 41) 
The late delivery of such a report is prejudicial for 
many reasons, as any seasoned trial attorney knows. The report 
deals with a complex topic, whether or not someone suffers from 
brain injury. Later that same day, Mr. Onyeabor began calling 
his expert witnesses on the brain injury issue (Drs. Moress, 
Nielsen and Goka — see Vol. D of transcript), and had called 
virtually all of these witnesses by the close of trial on Friday, 
February 6th. Thus, none of Petitioner's witnesses really had an 
opportunity to read and assess Dr. Clark's report prior to the 
time they testified. Counsel did not have time to analyze the 
report and discuss it with his experts, because of the hectic 
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nature of daily trial preparation in a major case. Thus, 
Petitioner was effectively denied the important and critical 
opportunity to deal with Dr. Clark1s contentions with 
Petitionees witnesses on direct examination. 
In Sirianni v. General Motors Corp., su£ra, the trial 
judge excluded the testimony of a physician where the plaintiff 
presented no pre-trial report to the defense. The court regarded 
the testimony of the doctor as that of a "new medical witness" 
even though the doctor had treated the plaintiff three years 
prior to trial. The court held: 
The exclusion of such testimony without a 
prior report is a well-standing practice in 
this court under our pre-trial rules in 
support of a strong policy against the 
introduction of surprise testimony of expert 
opinion witnesses. 
Id. at 511. 
2. Inability to Obtain a Deposition. Because of Dr. 
Clarkfs late appearance in the case, and failure to provide a 
report until the third day of trial, Petitioner was effectively 
denied the opportunity to take a deposition. If Dr. Clark were a 
mere fact witness to the accident, that may not have been quite 
so prejudicial. However, he was the major expert witness called 
by the defendants in their attempt to establish that Petitioner 
did not suffer from brain injury. Pre-trial discovery of the 
views of a major expert witness is often critical and can 
determine the outcome. Such was the case here (see discussion 
below). Such a deposition would have been crucial in properly 
preparing direct testimony on the brain injury issue the 
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Petitioner intended to offer on the third, fourth and fifth days 
of trial. Petitioner's experts were thus deprived of whatever 
advantage would have been gleaned from having Dr. Clark's 
deposition in advance of their own testimonies. 
The Court of Appeals' Opinion states the Petitioner 
must now somehow demonstrate how this prejudiced the Petitioner. 
But how does one show the value of such a deposition that was 
never given and therefore not available for comment at trial? In 
a case such as this, failure to timely produce an expert for 
deposition should create a rebuttable presumption of prejudice. 
Otherwise, this court creates the irony of placing the burden on 
the party who has been wronged by the defendants' concealing of 
an expert witness, when it was the act of concealing that witness 
that inhibits the production of the proof of the prejudice which 
resulted. 
3. Report Failed to State a Conclusion. The failure 
of Dr. Clark's report to state a medical conclusion was highly 
prejudicial. The report contained no adverse diagnosis or clue 
as to what Dr. Clark's opinion really was on several issues 
having to do with brain injury (App. 41:7). The report made no 
claim, for example, that Petitioner suffered from any type of a 
pre-existing "personality disorder." This was quite damaging to 
Petitioner's case because Dr. Clark did state such an opinion for 
the first time on the witness stand at trial. When Dr. Clark was 
asked why there was no diagnosis in his report, he stated: 
I could do that readily. I think it is self-
evident in terms of it being a personality 
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disorder with histrionic features, and also 
explosive features as well. And his 
hysteroid, it is a personality disorder, 
other mixed type with histrionic, and I 
agree, an explosive feature as well, 
(emphasis added) (Note: The actual testimony 
was far more lucid; this passage reflects 
some confusion by the reporter.) 
(T. L-192:15). Dr. Clark also stated that the personality 
disorder was pre-existing. Since the doctor brought that up, 
counsel was forced to cross-examine on the issue (T. L-193-199). 
This gave Dr. Clark an additional opportunity to expound on Mr. 
Onyeabor's allegedly pre-existing personality disorder (T. L-193-
4). This would have not happened had Mr. Onyeabor's counsel had 
the prior opportunity to learn the details of Dr. Clark's opinion 
in a complete report. Furthermore, Petitioner could have dealt 
with that issue extensively during the direct examination of his 
witnesses during the first week of trial. 
E. INADEQUATE CROSS-EXAMINATION. 
The Court of Appeals1 Opinion states there was no 
prejudice to Petitioner because of Petitionees lengthy cross-
examination of Dr. Clark. As any trial lawyer knows, lengthy 
cross-examination is not always good, and frequently is bad, 
examination. It sometimes reflects lack of preparation. In this 
instance, the examination was lengthy because Petitioner's 
counsel was forced, in essence, to do discovery on the witness 
stand. It is an uncomfortable and an unfair position to be in. 
Had Mr. Onyeabor had the opportunity to discover Dr. Clark!s 
opinions prior to the trial, the cross-examination would have 
been more effective, and completed in half the time. 
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The fact of the matter is that Petitioner was not 
merely entitled to an interval of time at trial in which to 
conduct cross-examination of defendants1 major expert witness. 
The rules of court, professional courtesy and common sense 
dictate that Petitioner is entitled to effectively-prepared 
cross-examination. This presupposes a timely, pre-trial 
deposition, not taken during the heat of battle in a 12-day 
trial, with inadequate preparation and no opportunity to consult 
with Petitioner's experts. Such basic fairness and courtesy 
presupposes an opportunity to review, in quiet reflection, Dr. 
Clark's views in order to prepare cross-examination, and to do so 
sooner than Friday, the 13th, on the 10th day of a 12-day trial. 
F. SUMMARY. 
The Court of Appeals has sanctioned the concealing of a 
major expert witness until the last minute, and then asserted 
that Petitioner cannot show any prejudice thereby, when the 
wrongful act significantly inhibits the showing of that 
prejudice. This decision further ignores practical prejudice in 
trial practice. It will encourage the late disclosure of 
experts. It damages the utility of the laws of discovery, 
particularly Rules 26(e) and 35(b). One might as well tear out 
those pages because they are not going to be enforced by the 
Court of Appeals. 
This case allows one party to greatly and unfairly 
enhance the burden upon his or her opponent in litigation. Even 
though a party intends to use an expert witness a month and half 
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before a major trial, he can wait until six business days before 
the trial and hand-deliver a notice of the new expert to his 
opponent. Under Onyeabor, the offending party will "appear to 
have substantially complied with Rule 26(e)(1)" (Opinion, supra 
at 528) because that amount of time has been validated by the 
Court of Appeals. Furthermore, counsel will not have to deliver 
a Rule 35(b) report to the other side until the third day of 
trial, because that has been validated by the Court of Appeals. 
Additionally, the report can be evasive on the doctor's ultimate 
diagnosis of the client as long as the "subject matter and 
substance" of the testimony is contained in the report. 
Opinion, supra at 528. At the very least, the offending party 
will gain substantial advantage over his opponent, even if his 
opponent does manage to find the time to take the deposition of 
the doctor during trial. 
// 
// 
// 
// 
// 
// 
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CONCLUSION 
This case is bad law. The Supreme Court should reverse 
it and remand it for a new trial. 
DATED this 23th day of April, 1990. 
ROBERT B. SYKES 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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Emmanuel N. ONYEABOR, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
PRO ROOFING, INC., a Utah corpora-
tion, and Pam Bates, Defendants 
and Respondents. 
No. S70265-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Feb. 13, 1990. 
Northbound driver brought action 
against westbound driver and her hus-
band's business to recover for injuries 
caused by collision. The Third District 
Court, Salt Lake County, Bryant H. Croft, 
Senior Judge, entered judgment on jury 
verdict in favor of northbound driver and 
denied his motions for a new trial, judg-
ment notwithstanding verdict, and additur. 
Northbound driver appealed. The Court of 
Appeals, Bench, J., held that: (1) allegedly 
erroneous admission of testimony of de-
fense expert who was identified for north-
bound driver 12 days before trial did not 
prejudice him; (2) northbound driver was 
not negligent; and (3) evidence supported 
damage awards. 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and 
remanded. 
1. Courts e= l l l 
Precept that record should be made of 
all proceedings applies to conferences in 
chambers as well as courtroom proceed-
ings. 
2. Appeal and Error 3=654 
Affidavits which were not pan of 
record beiow could not supplement record 
on appeal. 
:;. Appeai and Error 3=1043(1) 
Allegedly erroneous admission of testi-
mony of defense expert who was identified 
for plaintiff 12 days before trial did not 
prejudice plaintiff, expert was one of five 
defense experts in response to testimony of 
plaintiffs 15 experts; and plaintiff thor-
ONYEABOR v. PRO ROOFING, INC. Utah 525 
Cite as 787 ?2d 525 (UtahApp0 1990) 
Proa, Rules 26(e)(1), 61; U.C.A.1953, 41-6-
46(1X1981). 
4. Appeai and Error <3=241 
Plaintiffs pretrial motion to exclude 
testimony of defense expert preserved is-
sue, even though plaintiff failed to object 
to expert's testimony. 
5. Automobiles <5=>167(1) 
Driver who was approaching intersec-
tion in his own lane of traffic at or near 
speed limit was not negligent when he col-
lided with a car that pulled out from a 
shopping center. 
6. Damages <3=>130(3), 133, 134(1), 135 
Evidence supported awards of $4,000 
for pain and suffering during four months 
following automobile accident, 81,850 for 
medical expenses, $4,500 for loss of earn-
ings, $5,000 for future medical and psycho-
therapy expenses, and $1,500 for future 
lost earnings; jury could believe evidence 
of back injury and could disbelieve evidence 
of head injury or causal connection be-
tween head injur/ and accident; and evi-
dence indicated that injured driver possibly 
had preexisting back condition. 
Robert B. Sykes and M. Gale Lemmon, 
Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appellant. 
William A. Stegall, Jr., Salt Lake City, 
for defendants and respondents. 
Before BENCH, BILLINGS and 
GREENWOOD, JJ. 
BENCH, Judge: 
Plaintiff appeals from a jury verdict in 
his favor in an action arising from injuries 
sustained in a motor vehicle accident. We 
affirm in part and reverse in part. 
FACTS 
On June 15, 1984, plaintiff Emmanuel M. 
Onyeabor was driving home for lunch from 
his job as a carpenter on a construction 
project in Midvaie, Utah. At approximate-
ly 1:10 p.m., he was traveling north on 900 
East in unincorporated Sait Lake County, Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Boulevard (7105 South). Plaintiffs vehicle 
was in the inside of two northbound lanes 
and was traveling at or near the posted 
speed limit of 45 m.p.h. 
As plaintiff approached the intersection, 
a car driven by defendant Pam Bates en-
tered 900 East from a shopping center on 
the southeast corner of the intersection. 
Bates was en route to perform an errand 
for her husband's business, defendant Pro 
Roofing, Inc. Bates intended to turn west 
onto Fort Union Boulevard from 900 East, 
and crossed over the northbound lanes of 
900 East to enter the left turn lane. The 
drivers' views of each other were obstruct-
ed by a northbound vehicle between them. 
When Bates's car suddenly entered plain-
tiff's lane of traffic, plaintiff attempted to 
stop, but could not, and skidded into 
Bates's vehicle. The collision caused minor 
damage to the right side of his car and the 
left rear bumper of Bates's car. 
Moments after the collision, plaintiff ap-
proached Bates's car and began shouting 
and cursing at her and pounding on the 
driver's side window. Bates remained in 
her vehicle. Eventually, plaintiff left to 
contact the sheriffs department, which dis-
patched a deputy to investigate the acci-
dent. The deputy's report indicated that 
neither party complained of injury at the 
time of the accident. 
Six months later, plaintiff brought suit, 
alleging that he had sustained "severe and 
continuing bodily injuries" in the accident, 
and sought damages for medical expenses 
and loss of earnings. The record indicates 
that he was treated in August 1984 for 
"low back pain," which he said he had 
experienced since the accident. This prob-
lem was subsequently diagnosed as a herni-
ated lumbar disk and was treated without 
surgery. 
Plaintiffs continuing treatment necessi-
tated a continuance of the trial originally 
scheduled for August 1985. Trial was con-
tinued without date, and plaintiffs attor-
ney withdrew from the case. Plaintiff re-
tained new counsel and trial was reset. 
Shortly thereafter, plaintiff again dis-
missed his attorney. One month after re-
after the accident, plaintiff filed a motion 
to amend his complaint to allege damages 
for "closed-head brain injur}' and/or post-
traumatic syndrome." The motion was 
granted with defendants' stipulation, and 
plaintiff amended his complaint to allege 
damages in excess of S600.000 for back, 
shoulder, head, and left wrist injuries. 
Plaintiff subsequently submitted an exten-
sive pretrial brief, claiming that he wai-
"permanentiy and totally disabled from fu-
ture meaningful employment." He sought 
damages in the amount of §1,152,498.79. 
Trial was held February 2-1S, 1987. Af-
ter more than thirty witnesses testified and 
more than a hundred exhibits were re-
ceived, the jury returned a special verdict 
in favor of plaintiff. Total damages were 
found to be $16,850, but the jury deter-
mined that 25% of the negligence involved 
in the accident was attributable to plaintiff. 
Plaintiff was awarded $12,637.50 plus in-
terest and costs, and the trial court denied 
his "Motions for a New Trial, for Judgment 
N.O.V. and for Additur." 
ISSUES 
Plaintiff appeals the jury verdict, claim-
ing that: (1) the trial judge was biased 
against him, and that such bias was mani-
fested in the judge's demeanor and com-
ments on the evidence; (2) the trial court 
erred by permitting a defense witness to 
testify at trial without adequate notice; (3) 
there was insufficient evidence to support 
the jury's finding that plaintiff was partial-
ly negligent; (4) the trial court abused its 
discretion in denying plaintiffs motion for 
additur or, in the alternative, new trial: 
and (5) the trial court erred in making 
certain evidentiary rulings. 
ANALYSIS 
I 
The procedure for resolving allegations 
of judicial bias is provided by Utah R.Civ.F-
63(b): 
Whenever a party to any action . . . or 
his attorney shall make and file an affi-
davit that the judge before whom such Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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such judge shall proceed cion was "impractical because Mr. Onyea-
bor needed to have the case tried for medi-
cal reasons." 
prejudice . 
no further therein, except to call in an-
other judge to hear and determine the 
matter. 
Every such affidavit shall state the 
facts and the reasons for the belief that 
such bias or prejudice exists, and shall be 
filed as soon as practicable after . . . 
such bias or prejudice is known. 
See also Birch v. Birch, 771 P.2d 1114, 
1116 (Utah Ct.App.1989). 
In this case, plaintiff never filed such an 
affidavit, even after the alleged bias admit-
tedly became known co him during the first 
day or two of trial.1 We need not decide, 
however, whether the sole failure to file 
this affidavit was procedurally fatal to the 
claim of bias, since there are a number of 
other infirmities underlying plaintiffs 
claim. 
Defendants assert chat plaintiff failed to 
make contemporaneous objections to the 
court's comments alleged to be prejudicial. 
"If something occurs which the party 
thinks is wrong and so prejudicial :o him 
that he thereafter cannot have a fair trial, 
he must make his objection promptly and 
seek redress by moving for a mistrial, or 
by having cautionary instructions given, if 
that is deemed adequate, or be held to 
waive whatever rights may have existed to 
do so." Hill v. Cloward. 14 Utah 2d 55. 
53, 377 P.2d 186, 188 (1962). Otherwise. 
•*[i]t would be manifestly unjust co permit a 
party to sit silently by. believing that preju-
dicial error had been committed" and :hen 
''if he loses, come forward" claiming error. 
Id. 
Plaintiff states that, "Obviously, Mr. 
Onyeabor's counsel vas reluctant :o object 
every time the jour: commented :n the 
evidence." Although reluctance co make 
frequent objections may be understanda-
ble, we railed co rind in the portions of the 
record highlighted by plaintiff even one 
such contemporaneous objection. Nor can 
we find any motion made by plaintiff for a 
mistrial. Plaintiff states chat such a mo-
!. See Madsen ;'. Prudential fed. Saw i& Loan, 
767 ?.2d 558, 542
 vUtah Cr.App.1988) -.Motions 
to disqualify must be made promptly and may 
[1] Plaintiff nonetheless argues that he 
made a proper objection in chambers after 
the third day of trial. The discussion be-
tween counsel and the court went unre-
corded because the reporter had departed 
for the day. The precept that a record 
should be made of all proceedings applies 
to conferences in chambers as well as 
courtroom proceedings. Birch, 771 P.2d at 
1116. "The burden is on the parties to 
make certain that the record they compile 
will adequately preserve their arguments 
for review in the event of an appeal." 
Franklin Fin. v. New Empire Dev. Co., 
659 P.2d 1040, 1045 (Utah 1983). 
We are thus constrained by the record, 
which includes the following remarks by 
the trial judge during the hearing on plain-
tiffs motion for new trial: 
You have made mention of the fact . . . 
that some of your witnesses sitting in 
the courtroom told you that it was obvi-
ous that the judge didn't like you. Weil, 
again if they got that impression, I'm 
sorry, because that isn't true 
But you go on in your brief stressing 
the fact that my conduct throughout the 
trial gave the jury a powerful message 
that your methods were time consuming, 
meaningless, perhaps an attempt to put 
something over on the jury. That sur-
prised me And you suggest that my 
conduct, by the tone of my voice, by the 
shrug of my shoulders, by a sigh, gave a 
powerful message to the jury that I 
didn't think much of your case, and I was 
trying to hurry the case along and noc 
willing to give you a fair shake The 
only way I can respond to that sort of 
indictment of the Court's conduct at the 
trial is by saying I plead not guilty 
I deny that throughout the trial I did 
things intentionally or unintentionally to 
discredit you or your witnesses or to the 
face of the jury. 
only when rulings are unfavorable. "Not only 
is such a tactic unfair, but it may evidence a 
belief that the judge is not in fact biased."). Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
528 Utah 787 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
[2] There is nothing to contradict defen-
dants' observation that the questioned re-
marks were "simply explanatory state-
ments made by the court either in the 
course of ruling on objections, or limiting 
the admissibility of evidence or testimony. 
or clarifying the testimony given by a wit-
ness." 2 Based on our review of the 
record, including the instructions given to 
the jury,c we reject plaintiffs claim of bias. 
II 
[3] Plaintiff also claims that the court 
erred in admitting the testimony of Dr. 
Lincoln Clark, an expert witness for the 
defense. Plaintiff describes Dr. Clark as a 
"surprise" witness in that plaintiff had no 
notice of his planned testimony until six 
business days before trial and did not r e 
ceive a copy of Dr. Clark's report until the 
third day of trial. 
Defendants retained the services of Dr. 
Clark, a psychiatrist, after a previous ex-
pert was unable to continue his involve-
ment in the case due to ill health. After 
interviewing plaintiff. Dr. Clark determined 
that his involvement in the case constituted 
a significant risk to his safety and the 
safety of his family. On December 5,1986, 
the court continued the trial date based on 
Dr. Clark's assertion that his disassociation 
with the case was final. On January 21, 
1987, however, defendants filed an amend-
ed witness list on which Dr. Clark's name 
reappeared. Defendants contended that 
Dr. Clark had reevaluated his decision, and 
became convinced he had overstated the 
threat to his safety. Plaintiff then filed a 
motion in limine to exclude Dr. Clark as a 
witness. Judge Croft heard the motion on 
January 30, the Friday before trial, and 
decided to permit Dr. Clark to testify pro-
vided that a written report wras submitted 
2. Plaintiff has attempted to supplement the 
record on appeal with affidavits attesting to 
alleged nonverbal manifestations of bias on the 
part of the trial judge. Although his motion was 
provisionally granted pending the hearing of 
this appeal, affidavits which are not pan of the 
record below will generally not be considered 
on appeal. See State v. Aase, 762 P.2d 1113, 
lllTYUtah Ct.App.1988). Accordingly, we now 
deny plaintiffs motion to supplement the 
record. 
to plaintiff the first day or two of trial. A 
copy of that report was subsequently deliv-
ered to plaintiff early Wednesday morning, 
the third day of trial. Dr. Clark testified 
on February 13, nine days later; plaintiff 
neither objected to the testimony nor 
moved for a continuance. 
[4] Defendants argue that plaintiff 
failed to preserve the issue for appeal by 
failing to object at the time Dr. Clark was 
called to the witness stand. However, 
plaintiffs pretrial motion to exclude the 
testimony was adequate to preserve the 
issue. "A matter is sufficiently raised if it 
is submitted to the trial court, and the 
court is afforded an opportunity7 to rule on 
the issue." Hardy v. Hardy, 776 P.2d 917, 
924 (Utah CtApp.1989) (quoting State v. 
One 1979 Pontiac Trans Am, 771 P.2d 682. 
684 (Utah Ct.App.1989)). 
The essence of plaintiffs objection ap-
pears to be that he was prejudiced because 
there was insufficient time prior to trial to 
depose Dr. Clark. However, defendants 
appear to have substantially complied with 
rule 26(e)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure requiring a party to 
seasonably supplement his response with 
respect to any question directly ad-
dressed to . . . the identity of each person 
expected to be called as an expert wit-
ness at trial, the subject matier on which 
he is expected to testify, and the sub-
stance of his testimony. 
Dr. Clark was identified twelve days be-
fore trial and plaintiffs counsel was famil-
iar with Dr. Clark from his testimony in 
another head injury lawsuit. The subject 
matter and substance of the expert's testi-
mony was contained in the report delivered 
to plaintiff nine days before Dr. Clark testi-
fied. 
3. See, eg., Jury Instruction No. 2: 
Anything done or said by me during the tnai 
should not be considered by you as indicating 
my view on any issue in this case. Any belie: 
you may have as to what my view may be 
should receive no consideration by you in 
your deliberations. 
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Even if we assume that the admission of 
Dr. Clark's testimony constituted error, 
plaintiff fails to demonstrate how he was 
prejudiced. Any error in the admission of 
evidence must be disregarded unless it af-
fects the substantial rights of the parties. 
Utah R.Civ.P, 61. This provision has been 
construed as "placing upon an appellant 
the burden of showing not only that an 
error occurred, but that it was substantial 
and prejudicial in that the appellant was 
deprived in some manner of a full and fair 
consideration of the disputed issues by the 
jury." Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147, 
154 (Utah 1987). Dr. Clark was but one of 
five expert witnesses called by defendants 
in response to the testimony of plaintiffs 
fifteen experts. In view of the extensive 
presentation of expert testimony and plain-
tiffs thorough cross-examination of Dr. 
Clark, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate 
prejudice resulting from the admission of 
Dr. Clark's testimony. Accordingly, we 
conclude that plaintiffs claim is without 
merit. 
Ill 
[5] We next address plaintiffs conten-
tion that there was insufficient evidence to 
support a finding of negligence on the part 
of plaintiff. A jury verdict will be reversed 
"only if, viewing the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the verdict, there is no 
substantial evidence to support it." Can-
yon Country Store v. Bracey, 781 P.2d 
414, 417 (Utah 1989) (quoting In re Estate 
o/Kesler, 702 P.2d 86, 88 (Utah 1985)). An 
appellant must marshal all the evidence 
supporting the verdict and then show that 
the evidence is insufficient to support it 
even when viewed in the light most favor-
able to the verdict. Von Hake v. Thomas, 
705 P.2d 766, 769 (Utah 1985). 
We have reviewed the evidence mar-
shaled by plaintiff and agree that it cannot 
support a finding that plaintiff was partial-
ly negligent. There is no dispute that 
plaintiff was traveling in his own lane of 
traffic at or near the speed limit before the 
accident. The relevant statutory provision 
No person shall drive a vehicle at a speed 
greater than is reasonable and prudent 
under the conditions and having regard 
to the actual and potential hazards then 
existing. Consistent with the foregoing, 
every person shall drive at a safe and 
appropriate speed when approaching and 
crossing an intersection or . . . when spe-
cial hazards exist with respect to pedes-
trians or other traffic or by reason of 
weather or highway conditions. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-46(1) (1981). 
Although a jury may determine that the 
operation of a motor vehicle within the 
speed limit may be negligent under given 
circumstances, see Lochhead v. Jensen, 42 
Utah 99, 102-03, 129 P. 347, 348-49 (1912), 
there is no evidence indicating that plaintiff 
drove faster than was reasonable and pru-
dent, or that the speed was unsafe and 
inappropriate, or that road or weather con-
ditions necessitated a slower speed. Nor 
was there evidence of special hazards or 
unsafe driver behavior. The only evidence 
that was offered to suggest that plaintiff 
was negligent was the testimony of one of 
the defense experts who was "concerned" 
that plaintiffs car was still moving at the 
speed limit "that close to an intersection." 
In short, we could find no substantial evi-
dence that would support a reduction in 
damages for plaintiffs negligence. Ac-
cordingly, we reverse the special verdict 
attributing 25?o of the total negligence to 
plaintiff. 
IV 
[6] The final contention of plaintiff 
which we fully address is that involving the 
trial court's denial of his motion for additur 
or, in the alternative, a new trial. Under 
rule 59(a)(5) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, a new trial may be granted or a 
new judgment may be entered if the influ-
ence of passion or prejudice resulted in 
inadequate damages. "However, when the 
damages are not so inadequate as to indi-
cate a disregard of the evidence by the 
jury, a court is not empowered to entertain 
a motion for an additur." Duvuis v. Niet-
son, 624 P.2d 685, 686 (Utah* 1981). This 
deference given on review of a damages 
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award stems from the "prerogative of the 
jury to make the determination of dam-
ages." Jensen v. Eakins, 575 P.2d 179, 
180 (Utah 1978). "[W]e cannot substitute 
our judgment for that of the fact finder 
unless the evidence compels a finding that 
reasonable men and women would, of ne-
cessity, come to a different conclusion." 
Id. 
Plaintiff alleged various injuries result-
ing from the accident, including injuries to 
his back and head. The jury's verdict obvi-
ously reflects the fact that they believed 
plaintiffs evidence of a back injury, but 
either did not believe that there was a head 
injury or that it was not caused by the 
accident. 
In closing argument, defense counsel 
summarized plaintiffs damages that were 
consistent with a back injury. He calculat-
ed plaintiffs medical expenses to be $1,835. 
The jury awarded plaintiff $1,850. De-
fense counsel estimated plaintiffs loss of 
earnings to be $3,200. The jury awarded 
$4,500. Defense counsel suggested that 
$4,000 was a reasonable sum for general 
damages for pain and suffering during the 
four months following the accident. The 
jury awarded plaintiff $4,000. The jury 
also awarded plaintiff $5,000 for future 
medical and psychotherapy expenses and 
$1,500 for future lost earnings. These 
amounts appear to be reasonable, particu-
larly in view of other evidence that plaintiff 
may have had a preexisting back condition 
which was aggravated by the accident and 
an incident in a "karate class." 
On the other hand, defense counsel ar-
gued that plaintiff demonstrated "no loss 
of consciousness, no amnesia, no external 
sign of injury" after the accident—in short, 
"no sound evidence" of brain injury. This 
hotly disputed question of fact was for the 
jury, whose exclusive province it is to 
weigh the evidence and determine the cred-
ibility of witnesses. See Steele v. Brein-
holt, 747 P.2d 433, 436 (Utah Ct.App.1987). 
We conclude that "reasonable minds acting 
fairly" could lack "reasonable certainty 
that plaintiff suffered such injur}' and dam-
age." Dunn v. McKay, Burton, McMur-
ray & Thurman, 584 P.2d 894, 896 (Utah 
1978). Thus, plaintiff simply failed to con-
vince the jury of his entire case. 
With respect to plaintiffs claims regard-
ing various evidentiary rulings, a trial 
court's determination to admit or exclude 
evidence will not be overturned in the ab-
sence of an abuse of discretion. Pearce v. 
Wistisen, 701 P.2d 489, 491 (Utah 1985). 
We have reviewed the rulings in question 
and conclude that there was no abuse of 
discretion. 
In summary, we affirm the finding of 
liability against defendants, but reverse the 
finding of negligence attributable to plain-
tiff and remand the case to modify the 
judgment consistent with this opinion. 
BILLINGS and GREENWOOD, JJ., 
concur. 
( o I KEY NUMBER SYSTEM> 
Sharleen M. McREYNOLDS, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
Glenn L. McREYNOLDS, Defendant 
and Respondent. 
No. 890172-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Feb. 13, 1990. 
Former wife sought to recover past 
due child support. Former husband filed 
counterpetition seeking reduction and revi-
sion in schedule for visitation. The Fourth 
District Court, Utah Count}', George E. 
Ballif, J., refused to award judgment for 
unpaid child support. Wife appealed. The 
Court of Appeals held that wife's interfer-
ence with or prevention of husband's exer-
cise of visitation rights did not permit trial 
court to extinguish past due child support. 
Reversed and remanded. 
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UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 26 
impracticable for the party seeking discovery to obtain facts or opin-
ions on the same subject by other means. 
(C) Unless manifest injustice would result, 
(i) The court shall require that the party seeking discovery 
pay the expert a reasonable fee for time spent in responding to 
discovery under Subdivisions (b)(4)(A)(ii) and (b)(4)(B) of this 
rule; and 
(ii) With respect to discovery obtained under Subdivision 
(b)(4)(A)(ii) of this rule the court may require, and with respect 
to discovery obtained under Subdivision (b)(4)(B) of this rule the 
court shall require, the party seeking discovery to pay the other 
party a fair portion of the fees and expenses reasonably incurred 
by the latter party in obtaining facts and opinions from the ex-
pert. 
(c) Protective orders. Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom 
discovery is sought, and for good cause shown, the court in which the action is 
pending or alternatively, on matters relating to a deposition, the court in the 
district where the deposition is to be taken may make any order which justice 
requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppres-
sion, or undue burden or expense, including one or more of the following: 
(1) that the discovery not be had; 
(2) that the discovery may be had only on specified terms and condi-
tions, including a designation of the time or place; 
(3) that the discovery may be had only by a method of discovery other 
than that selected by the party seeking discovery; 
(4) that certain matters not be inquired into, or that the scope of the 
discovery be limited to-certain matters; 
(5) that discovery be conducted with no one present except persons 
designated by the court; 
(6) that a deposition after being sealed be opened only by order of the 
court; 
(7) that a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or 
commercial information not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a desig-
nated way; 
(8) that the parties simultaneously file specified documents or informa-
tion enclosed in sealed envelopes to be opened as directed by the court. 
If the motion for a protective order is denied in whole or in part, the court 
may, on such terms and conditions as are just, order that any party or person 
provide or permit discovery. The provisions of Rule 37(a)(4) apply to the award 
of expenses incurred in relation to the motion. 
(d) Sequence and timing of discovery. Unless the court upon motion, for 
the convenience of parties and witnesses and in the interests of justice, orders 
otherwise, methods of discovery may be used in any sequence and the fact that 
a party is conducting discovery, whether by deposition or otherwise, shall not 
operate to delay any other party's discovery. 
(e) Supplementation of responses. A party who has responded to a re-
quest for discovery with a response that was complete when made is under no 
duty to supplement his response to include information thereafter acquired, 
except as follows: 
(1) A party is under a duty seasonably to supplement his response with 
respect to any question directly addressed to (A) the identity and location 
75 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Rule 26 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
of persons having knowledge of discoverable matters, and (B) the identity 
of each person expected to be called as an expert witness at trial, the 
subject matter on which he is expected to testify, and the substance of his 
testimony. 
(2) A party is under a duty seasonably to amend a prior response if he 
obtains information upon the basis of which (A) he knows that the re-
sponse was incorrect when made, or (B) he knows that the response 
though correct when made is no longer true and the circumstances are 
such that a failure to amend the response is in substance a knowing 
concealment. 
(3) A duty to supplement responses may be imposed by order of the 
court, agreement of the parties, or at any time prior to trial through new 
requests for supplementation of prior responses. 
(f) Discovery conference. At any time after commencement of an action, 
the court may direct the attorneys for the parties to appear before it for a 
conference on the subject of discovery. The court shall do so upon motion by 
the attorney for any party if the motion includes: 
(1) a statement of the issues as they then appear; 
(2) a proposed plan and schedule of discovery; 
(3) any limitations proposed to be placed on discovery; 
(4) any other proposed orders with respect to discovery; and 
(5) a statement showing that the attorney making the motion has 
made a reasonable effort to reach agreement with opposing attorneys on 
the matters set forth in the motion. Each party and his attorney are 
under a duty to participate in good faith in the framing of a discovery 
plan if a plan is proposed by the attorney for any party. Notice of the 
motion shall be served on all parties. Objections or additions to matters 
set forth in the motion shall be served not later than ten days after 
service of the motion. 
Following the discovery conference, the court shall enter an order tenta-
tively identifying the issues for discovery purposes, establishing a plan and 
schedule for discovery, setting limitations on discovery, if any, and determin-
ing such other matters, including the allocation of expenses, as are necessary 
for the proper management of discovery in the action. An order may be altered 
or amended whenever justice so requires. 
Subject to the right of a party who properly moves for a discovery conference 
to prompt convening of the conference, the court may combine the discovery 
conference with a pretrial conference authorized by Rule 16. 
(g) Signing of discovery requests, responses, and objections. Every 
request for discovery or response or objection thereto made by a party repre-
sented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his 
individual name, whose address shall be stated. A party who is not repre-
sented by an attorney shall sign the request, response, or objection and state 
his address. The signature of the attorney or party constitutes a certification 
that he has read the request, response, or objection and that to the best of his 
knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is: (1) 
consistent with these rules and warranted by existing law or a good faith 
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law; (2) not 
interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unneces-
sary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation; and (3) not unreason-
able or unduly burdensome or expensive, given the needs of the case, the 
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Rule 35, Physical and mental examination of persons. 
(a) Order for examination. When the mental or physical condition (in-
cluding the blood group) of a party, or of a person in the custody or under the 
legal control of a party is in controversy, the court in which the action is 
pending may order the party to submit to a physical or mental examination by 
a physician or to produce for examination the person in his custody or legal 
control. The order may be made only on motion for good cause shown and upon 
notice to the person to be examined and to all parties and shall specify the 
time, place, manner, conditions, and scope of the examination and the person 
or persons by whom it is to be made. 
(b) Report of examining physician. 
(1) If requested by the party against whom an order is made under 
Rule 35(a) or the person examined, the party causing the examination to 
be made shall deliver to him a copy of a detailed written report of the 
examining physician setting out his findings, including results of all tests 
made, diagnosis and conclusions, together with like reports of all earlier 
examinations of the same condition. After delivery the party causing the 
examination shall be entitled upon request to receive from the party 
against whom the order is made a like report of any examination, previ-
ously or thereafter made, of the same condition, unless, in the case of a 
report of examination of a person not a party, the party shows that he is 
unable to obtain it. The court on motion may make an order against a 
party requiring delivery of a report on such terms as are just, and if a 
physician fails or refuses to make a report the court may exclude his 
testimony if offered at the trial. 
(2) By requesting and obtaining a report of the examination so ordered 
or by taking the deposition of the examiner, the party examined waives 
any privilege he may have in that action or any other involving the same 
controversy, regarding the testimony of every other person who has ex-
amined or may thereafter examine him in respect of the same mental or 
physical condition. 
(3) This subdivision applies to examinations made by agreement of the 
parties, unless the agreement expressly provides otherwise. This subdivi-
sion does not preclude discovery of a report of an examining physician or 
the taking of a deposition of the physician in accordance with the provi-
sions of any other rule. 
(c) Right of party examined to other medical reports. At the time of 
making an order to submit to a medical examination under Subdivision (a) of 
this rule, the court shall, upon motion of the party to be examined, order the 
party seeking such examination to furnish to the party to be examined a 
report of any examination previously made or medical treatment previously 
given by any physician employed directly or indirectly by the party seeking 
the order for a physical or mental examination, or at whose instance or re-
quest such medical examination or treatment has previously been conducted. 
If the party seeking the examination refuses to deliver such report, the court 
on motion and notice may make an order requiring delivery on such terms as 
are just; and if a physician fails or refuses to make such a report the court may 
exclude his testimony if offered at the trial, or may make such other order as 
is authorized under Rule 37. 
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